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Abstract—The emerging data traffic demand has caused a mas-6
sive deployment of network infrastructure, including macro base7
stations (BSs) and small cells (SCs), leading to increased energy8
consumption and expenditures. However, the network underuti-9
lization during low traffic periods (e.g., night zone) enables the10
mobile network operators (MNOs) to save energy by having their11
traffic served by third-party SCs, thus being able to switch off12
their BSs. In this paper, we propose a novel market approach to13
foster the opportunistic utilization of the unexploited SCs capacity,14
where the MNOs, instead of requesting the maximum capacity15
to meet their highest traffic expectations, offer a set of bids re-16
questing different amounts of resources from the third-party SCs17
at lower costs. Motivated by the conflicting financial interests of18
the MNOs and the third party, the restricted capacity of the SCs19
that is not adequate to carry the whole traffic in multioperator20
scenarios, and the necessity for energy-efficient solutions, we in-21
troduce a combinatorial auction framework, which includes 1) a22
bidding strategy, 2) a resource-allocation scheme, and 3) a pricing23
rule. We propose a multiobjective framework as an energy- and24
cost-efficient solution for the resource-allocation problem, and we25
provide extensive analytical and experimental results to estimate26
the potential energy and cost savings that can be achieved. In27
addition, we investigate the conditions under which the MNOs28
and the third-party companies should take part in the proposed29
auction.30
Index Terms—Auction, energy efficiency, game theory, green31
networking, heterogeneous networks (HetNets), multiobjective op-32
timization, offloading, switching off.33
I. INTRODUCTION34
A. Motivation35
The rapid expansion of mobile services, along with the36
emerging demand for multimedia applications, driven by the37
widespread use of laptops, tablets, and smart devices, has led38
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to an impressive growth of data traffic during the last few 39
years. Global mobile data traffic is expected to increase nearly 40
tenfold, reaching 24.3 EB per month by 2019 [1]. Hence, 41
mobile network operators (MNOs1) seek to extend their in- 42
frastructure by installing more base stations (BSs). In an effort 43
to increase the capacity of their network and meet these press- 44
ing traffic demands, they also lease capacity and bandwidth 45
resources from third parties, who deploy low-powered small- 46
cell (SC) networks to provide enhanced services via traffic 47
offloading from macro BSs to SCs during peak hours [2]. For 48
instance, Nokia Networks [3] has recently built networks of 49
interconnected SCs, enabling operators to extend the coverage 50
and increase the capacity of existing macro networks. The 51
involvement of various entities of corporate nature with differ- 52
ent financial goals generates a new ecosystem with interesting 53
dynamics to be studied. To that end, in [4], the economics 54
of offloading are investigated, whereas auction theory is used 55
to model economic transactions between conflicting parties in 56
several works [5]–[7] through offloading schemes with auction- 57
based resource-allocation problems. 58
The dense heterogeneous networks (HetNets) imply sig- 59
nificant increase in the capital and operational expenditures 60
(CapEx and OpEx) of MNOs [8], and as a result, there is a 61
strong motivation to investigate energy-efficient solutions to 62
bring down the energy consumption and the cost of networks. 63
This goal can be accomplished through the switching off of the 64
underutilized nodes when the traffic is significantly low. Since 65
the BSs are the most power hungry and expensive components 66
of the networks [9], the research community has shifted toward 67
the investigation of BS switching-off schemes [10]–[15]. De- 68
spite their promising results, these works examine only one tier 69
of macro BSs, whereas the presence of multiple MNOs raises 70
new challenges and open issues. 71
The SC deployment in current HetNets can be the key to 72
implementing novel energy and cost-efficient solutions. By 73
encouraging the traffic offloading from BSs to SCs during low 74
traffic periods, when the SC resources are most likely to remain 75
unused, part of the BS infrastructure can be switched off. Given 76
that the energy consumption of the BSs is considerably higher 77
with respect to the SCs, even when the traffic load is low, such 78
solutions can yield high energy gains for the MNOs. Thus, 79
offloading can be exploited to concentrate the users to the SCs 80
1The terms “MNO” and “operator” will be used interchangeably in the
remainder of this paper.
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and allow the BSs with no traffic to be switched off. However,81
despite the potential gains of the opportunistic exploitation of82
the capacity of SCs and the deactivation of the redundant BSs83
during low traffic conditions, very few research works exist in84
the literature so far.85
An overview of the existing techniques in energy-efficient86
network planning is presented in [16], highlighting the advan-87
tages and the shortcomings of the algorithms and revealing88
the open issues that should be further studied in the field of89
HetNets and operators’ collaboration. In the same context, in90
[17], an auction-based offloading scheme is proposed for the BS91
switching off, where the operators submit a bidding value, and a92
third party’s income optimization approach is followed to solve93
the resource-allocation problem. However, only a particular94
network configuration is considered, where it is assumed that95
the SC capacity is sufficient to serve the traffic of the network,96
allowing the switching off of all the BSs.97
Despite the clear benefits of the BSs switching off via of-98
floading, the presence of multiple MNOs in the same area [18]99
would complicate the application of this scheme since the SCs100
may not be able to fully support the network traffic. Another101
limitation of the auction-based state-of-the-art works [5], [6],102
[17] consists in the fact that the MNOs propose a single103
bidding value for the requested capacity, based on the maximum104
predictions about the traffic that they are willing to offload.105
However, these predictions do not always correspond to the106
real traffic values, which can be significantly lower than the107
maximum values, leading to increased costs for the operators108
and inefficient use of the SC capacity resources.109
B. Contribution110
In this paper, motivated by the aforementioned issues, we111
propose a novel energy-efficient solution for dense HetNets,112
which considers the interests of the involved parties (MNOs and113
third party) and the time-varying traffic characteristics. More114
specifically, we introduce an offloading mechanism, where the115
operators lease the capacity of an SC network owned by a third116
party, to be able to switch off their BSs and maximize their117
energy efficiency, when the traffic demand is low. The MNOs118
request capacity from several SCs and can only switch off their119
BSs if all their requests are satisfied, enabling them to offload120
all their traffic to the SC network.121
To that end, the allocation of the SC resources among a122
set of competing MNOs is mathematically formulated as an123
auction. Since the exact resource requirements of the network124
are unknown beforehand, the MNOs employ past reports to125
predict the maximum expected traffic load. Then, exploiting126
the fact that, with a high probability, the actual traffic will127
be lower than the predicted maximum (especially during low128
traffic periods), the MNOs submit a set of bids to the SCs,129
requesting for lower capacity resources (with respect to the130
maximum estimated requirements). With this approach, the SC131
resources can be more efficiently utilized, and the MNOs are132
likely to pay a lower price for the leased capacity, taking a133
small risk of not being able to serve all users under some134
circumstances (i.e., when the traffic approaches the maximum135
predictions and the leased capacity is not sufficient). Our key136
contribution is to study this very interesting trade-off between 137
the potential energy and financial gains of this solution and 138
the risk of not fully satisfying all the users, thus providing the 139
MNOs with the necessary insights to decide whether it is prof- 140
itable to participate in the auction, depending on their tolerance 141
to the potential loss of some users. 142
In addition, the conflicting interests of the involved parties 143
are also taken into consideration. On the one hand, the MNOs 144
aim to reduce their energy consumption and expenditures by 145
offloading their traffic and switching off their BS infrastructure. 146
However, to deactivate a BS, all its traffic should be offloaded 147
to the SC network (i.e., the MNO should win in all the auctions 148
involving the particular BS). On the other hand, the third 149
party wants to maximize its income by leasing the maximum 150
possible amount for resources to the MNOs. However, the 151
resource allocation policy that maximizes the third party’s 152
income may not enable the operators to switch off their BSs. 153
Our proposed auction-based strategy takes into account these 154
conflicting interests to achieve a feasible, efficient, and energy- 155
saving resource-allocation scheme. 156
In summary, the contribution of this paper is described as 157
follows. 158
159
1) Bidding Strategy: We propose a novel bidding strategy, 160
where MNOs submit a set of bids (and not only one bid) 161
to the third party, requesting different capacity resources, 162
based on the predictions about their maximum traffic. The 163
diversity of bids allows more offloading opportunities, 164
which is profitable for both the MNOs and the third party. 165
2) Auction Design and Switching Off Decision: We design 166
an auction scheme that enables the efficient usage of SCs 167
resources under low traffic conditions. Our framework 168
motivates the MNOs to quantify their tolerance about 169
requesting fewer resources and form the different levels 170
of bids. We show that the proposed auction-based scheme 171
has two desirable properties: 1) truthfulness; and 2) indi- 172
vidual rationality. The mechanism is designed based on a 173
multiobjective framework, where the conflicting interests 174
of the involved parties are considered, to provide the 175
optimal solution that maximizes the economic profit of 176
both the third party and the MNOs and minimizes the 177
network energy consumption at the same time. 178
3) Performance Evaluation: We validate the theoretical 179
analysis of the multiobjective problem by computing 180
the Pareto front (i.e., the set of optimal) solutions and 181
assess the effectiveness of the proposed auction-based 182
switching-off algorithm. The analytical and simula- 183
tion results indicate the potential energy efficiency and 184
economic gains in the network and give the necessary 185
insights to the MNOs to decide whether it is beneficial 186
to enter in a resource allocation negotiation with the 187
third party. 188
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 189
system model is described in Section II. In Section III, we in- 190
troduce the auction-based optimization approach that is used for 191
the BSs’ switching-off decision. The performance evaluation is 192
provided in Sections IV and V concludes this paper. 193
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Fig. 1. Network configuration with one macro cell served by N MNOs and
covered by M third-party SCs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND OPERATION194
A. Network Configuration195
We consider an urban scenario, focusing on an area of a196
macro cell. In the macro cell, we assume that N MNOs provide197
coverage through their BSs, which are denoted by BSn, where198
n ∈ N = {1, . . . , N} characterizes the MNOn. Let us high-199
light that, in dense networks, due to legal regulations, MNOs200
are obligated to install their antennas and BSs on the same201
buildings; thus, we examine networks with collocated BSs [18].202
Moreover, in the macro cell, SCs, owned by a third party, are203
randomly distributed. Each SC is represented as SCm, where204
m ∈ M = {1, . . . ,M}. We assume that the number of SCs is205
adequate to cover the area of the macro cell [19]. As it will be206
explained in the following, the MNOs are motivated to offload207
their traffic to the third-party SCs by paying the corresponding208
price, thus enabling part of BS infrastructure to be switched209
off during low traffic conditions. The network configuration is210
shown in Fig. 1.211
B. Traffic Load Model212
In this paper, we adopt a realistic traffic pattern [20], [21]213
that corresponds to the maximum traffic per operator in a given214
cell. Fig. 2(a) plots the maximum traffic per hour, which is215
denoted by Loadmax(h), throughout the day.2 Without loss of216
generality, we focus on the time zone between 01:00 A.M. and217
09:00 A.M., when the traffic per BS is relatively low (i.e., less218
than 40 Mb/s, which corresponds to 35% of the cell’s capacity).219
The selection of the night zone may vary according to the traffic220
variations, and our algorithm can be adapted to different traffic221
conditions. In addition, we assume that the traffic volumes of222
different MNOs may be different, although they follow the223
same pattern. Hence, we define ρn ∈ [0, 1] as the percentage of224
each operator’s traffic load with respect to the maximum traffic225
for the respective hour. In this paper, we have used traffic data226
sets that include information of one operator for ten BSs during227
the period of one year, thus including weekends, weekdays,228
and day and night hours. To that end, the reports consists of229
various values for both low and high traffic. Provided that the230
2The parameter h can be dropped for the sake of simplicity.
Fig. 2. Traffic pattern scenario and real data traffic values. (a) Traffic load
during the 24-hour day. (b) Real data for traffic load patterns.
data sets had huge information, we classified the days of the 231
year into different periods of time (e.g., seasons, weekdays, 232
and weekends). Based on these real traffic reports and by 233
using simple statistical analysis, we have obtained the necessary 234
insights about the minimum, maximum, and average values of 235
the traffic load, and we have plotted some indicative numbers in 236
Fig. 2(b). Each one of the six values corresponds to the average 237
traffic that was observed in different days during the year. In 238
addition, we express the BS utilization as a percentage of the 239
total BS’s capacity resources for the extreme cases of minimum 240
and maximum traffic loads. The two values, i.e., Loadmin and 241
Loadmax, are very critical, and it is very important for the 242
MNOs to be able to predict them. 243
Unlike the existing works in the literature, where each MNO 244
places only one bid corresponding to the maximum capacity 245
requirements, in this paper, we propose that the MNOs place 246
multiple bids corresponding to different levels of the predicted 247
traffic load, as shown in Fig. 2(b). Thus, given the estimated 248
minimum and maximum traffic load levels and assuming that 249
the actual traffic values will, most probably, lie between these 250
extreme values, we are able to calculate different levels of 251
traffic. In this paper, we consider L+ 1 different traffic load 252
levels. The number of levels depends on the MNOs’ strategy 253
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Fig. 3. Traffic during the night zone and different levels of traffic estimation.
that will be further explained in the following. Each level l ∈254
L = {0, . . . , L} corresponds to traffic that is equal to255
Loadl = Loadmin + Load
max − Loadmin
L
· l
=
(
1 − l
L
)
· Loadmin + l
L
· Loadmax. (1)
Evidently, the two extreme values are Load0 = Loadmin and256
LoadL = Loadmax. Fig. 3 shows an example, depicting various257
traffic levels for a specific hour (h = 02 :00 A.M.). Based258
on the above, Appendix A of the supplemental file provides259
a theoretical estimation of the traffic that can be offloaded,260
explaining the process of mapping the users of the MNOs to261
the capacity of the SCs.262
III. AUCTION-BASED SWITCHING-OFF ALGORITHM263
Here, we present the combinatorial auction employed to264
select the MNOs that can offload their traffic to the SCs, thus265
being able to switch off their BSs. We provide the bidding strat-266
egy, and we formulate the integer linear programming model,267
which ensures the optimal allocation and the switching-off268
strategy for the auction. In addition, to ensure truthful bidding,269
the Vickrey—Clarke—Grooves (VCG) payment mechanism270
[22] is employed.271
A. Big Picture272
By considering the limited capacity of the SCs and the273
MNOs’ incentive to switch off their BSs, we use an auction-274
based mechanism to motivate the operators to offload the traffic275
to the third-party SC network. Fig. 4 illustrates the main idea of276
the scheme. In our proposal, both the MNOs and the third party277
take part in the decision process, each one having a separate278
role in the framework. On one hand, the MNOs act as buyers,279
who are willing to lease the SCs resources and opportunistically280
offload their traffic. On the other hand, the third party, acting as281
a seller, collects the bids, and through an auction, the subset of282
MNOs that can offload their traffic, is selected. The proposed283
auction-based switching-off scheme consists of three main284
Fig. 4. Auction illustration and proposed algorithm flowchart.
steps: bidding, allocation, and pricing, whose process and the 285
respective decision-makers (in parenthesis) are presented as fol- 286
lows. First, in the bidding phase (MNOs), the MNOs place their 287
bids to the third party according to the different values of the 288
requested bandwidth. Each bid includes the information of the 289
requested capacity and the corresponding price that the MNO is 290
willing to offer. Second, in the allocation step (third party and 291
MNOs), the third party collects the MNOs’ bids. The selection 292
of the optimal resource allocation can be derived through the so- 293
lution of the resource-allocation problem. Third, in the pricing 294
step (third party), the third party decides each winner’s payment 295
price, based on the resource allocation of the previous step. The 296
winning MNOs offload their whole traffic to the SCs and switch 297
off their BSs, whereas the losing bidders keep their BSs active. 298
B. Bidding Strategy 299
Each SCm of the third party (seller) has unexploited capacity 300
resources that is willing to lease to the MNOs. The MNOs 301
(buyers) want to offload their traffic to the SCs by requesting 302
specific capacity resources to lease, based on the predictions 303
of the traffic load. The number of the physical resource blocks 304
(PRBs) is calculated in Appendix A of the supplementary AQ1305
file. The MNOs valuate the requested resource N lPRBn,m at a 306
given price uln,m, unknown to the third party and the other 307
bidders, where l is the level of resources, n ∈ N refers to 308
the corresponding operator, and m ∈ M corresponds to the 309
specific SC that the MNO wants to lease the resources from. In 310
the proposed auction-based scheme, each operator submits a set 311
of bid pairs Bln,m = (bln,m, N lPRBn,m), representing the price 312
bln,m ≤ uln,m, which the nth MNO pays for leasing the capacity 313
N lPRBn,m from the mth SC. In general, these two values (i.e., 314
bln,m, u
l
n,m) may not necessarily be the same. However, in a 315
truthful auction such as the one that we have (the truthfulness 316
property of the auction will be explained in Section III-D), it 317
is proved that the private valuation and the bidding price are 318
equal; thus, bln,m = uln,m [5], [6]. After the reception bid pairs, 319
the selection of the subset of the MNOs, whose traffic can be 320
offloaded to the corresponding SCs, follows. 321
IEE
E P
ro
of
BOUSIA et al.: MULTIOBJECTIVE AUCTION-BASED SWITCHING-OFF SCHEME IN HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS 5
Fig. 5. Bidding strategy versus tolerance function.AQ2
To gain further insights on the bidding strategy, let us322
consider the following example. Given the predicted expecta-323
tions about the traffic, each MNO m submits multiple bids,324
b0n,m, b
1
n,m, . . . , b
l
n,m, . . . , b
L
n,m, indicating the offered price for325
the requested number of PRBs. Through the different bid pairs,326
the MNOs actually reveal their outage probability tolerance.327
In particular, by leasing the maximum calculated number of328
PRBs (NLPRBn,m) for the highest bid b
L
n,m, the MNOs guarantee329
service to all their users. Controversially, by obtaining a smaller330
number of PRBs (e.g., N lPRBn,m with l < L), the MNO pays331
a smaller price at a risk of leaving some users in outage.332
The minimum number of requested PRBs N0PRBn,m constitutes333
an upper bound of the operator’s outage tolerance. Another334
parameter determined by each MNO is the number of levels.335
A higher number of levels results in more bid pairs, thus336
increasing the performance of the auction while inducing more337
communication overhead and higher computational complexity.338
To flexibly model the MNOs’ outage tolerance, we introduce339
a satisfaction function that represents the bidding value (which340
is equal to the valuation price) that the MNO is willing to341
pay for leasing a specific bandwidth. To that end, we define342
the number of lacking PRBs as the difference between the343
maximum number of PRBs minus the actually obtained PRBs344
allocated the MNO, given by345
N lPRBn,m,lack = N
L
PRBn,m −N lPRBn,m . (2)
The satisfaction function is determined by the requested ca-346
pacity of each MNO and is monotonically decreasing with the347
number of lacking PRBs. We also consider that, for each MNO,348
there is a lower bound for the minimum number of requested349
PRBs, which minimizes the MNO’s satisfaction. This bound350
indicates that for fewer PRBs the MNO will not participate in351
the auction. Fig. 5 shows three examples of the outage tolerance352
function. Three bidding values are emphasized in the plot: The353
highest bid bLn,m, corresponding to the maximum requested354
capacity NLPRBn,m (with N lPRBn,m,lack = 0), the lowest bid355
b0n,m, and an intermediate value bln,m. As the number of lacking356
PRBs increases (depicted by the arrow direction in Fig. 5), the357
bid values decrease, and as a consequence, losses in terms of the358
served users may be observed. If the number of lacking PRBs359
exceeds N0PRBn,m,lack, the MNO will not participate in the auc-360
tion; thus, no bid lower than b0n,m will be submitted. The three 361
points (A, B, and C) marked in Fig. 5 correspond to the different 362
tolerance functions of three operators. An outage-tolerant MNO 363
(point C) requests for less bandwidth for the same bidding value 364
bln,m compared with a nontolerant MNO (point A) that still 365
requests high capacity from the third party. Hence, the nontol- 366
erant MNO places higher priority on guaranteeing user service, 367
whereas the outage-tolerant MNO is willing to sacrifice some 368
resources to increase its probability of winning the auction and 369
switching off its BS, thus enhancing energy efficiency. Finally, 370
point B corresponds to an intermediate bidding strategy defined 371
by a linear function between the two examined parameters. 372
The user outage tolerance function (keeping in mind that 373
bln,m = u
l
n,m) is modeled as3 374
bln,m = b
L
n,m −
bLn,m − b0n,m
NLPRBn,m −N0PRBn,m
·
(
N lPRBn,m
)δ
. (3)
The distinctive cases for the satisfaction curves are as 375
follows. 376
377
• Nontolerant MNO (Point A): For the nontolerant MNO, 378
the outage tolerance function is convex, with δ < 1. 379
• Average-tolerant MNO (Point B). There is a linear re- 380
lation between the bidding strategies and the outage 381
tolerance of the MNOs, by substituting δ = 1 in (3). 382
• Tolerant MNO (Point C). For the tolerant MNO, the 383
satisfaction function is concave, with δ > 1. 384
The parameter δ may obtain a wide range of values. The selec- 385
tion of a value equal to δ  1 corresponds to a strictly nontoler- 386
ant MNO, who decreases its bid requests very fast. In contrast, a 387
very high value of this indicative parameter (i.e., δ  1) would 388
lead to very slowly decreasing bidding values and, thus, to a 389
very tolerant operator. 390
C. Auction Formulation 391
By employing the properties of combinatorial auction theory, 392
we formulate the problem of the opportunistic offloading as 393
an auction. Each MNO n ∈ N places the corresponding bid 394
pairs Bln,m. Having received the bids, the third party selects 395
the subset of MNOs that maximizes the desired goals of all the 396
involved participants. We define xln,m as a binary decision vari- 397
able that indicates whether the corresponding bidder (MNO n) 398
is winner (xln,m = 1) or not (xln,m = 0) in the corresponding 399
SCm and for the lth bidding value. 400
The cost of using the SC infrastructure and the increased 401
consumed energy are the main objectives: the maximization 402
of the profits (the economic objectives of the third party and 403
the MNOs) and the minimization of the energy consumption 404
(the energy objective). In continuation, a detailed analysis of 405
the objectives of each party is presented. 406
1) Third Party’s Objective: The third party aims at maximiz- 407
ing its profit by leasing high volumes of the capacity of SCs at 408
3The values of b0n,m and bLn,m will be calculated in details in the succeeding
section, where the constraints and requirements posed by the MNOs and the
third party are given within the optimization framework.
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increased prices. The profit is defined as the difference of the409
MNOs’ winning bids minus its expenses (CapEx and OpEx).410
We define the financial gain of the SC network CGSC as411
f1(x) = CGSC =
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xln,m · bln,m −M · CSC (4)
where CSC is the cost of a SC, corresponding to the sum of its412
CapEx and the traffic-dependent OpEx. For the calculation of413
the SCs cost, the cost model presented in [23] is employed.414
To ensure its objective, the third party introduces a minimum415
profit, which is described as a function of its total cost, i.e.,416
CGminSC = y ·M · CSC, y > 0. (5)
Given the minimum profit, which is calculated by (5), we417
estimate the reservation price as follows.418
Proposition 1: The reservation price is defined as the mini-419
mum price that a seller would be willing to accept for leasing420
the corresponding bandwidth, i.e.,421
blres,n,m =
N lPRBn,m
NmaxPRB
· y ·M · CSC. (6)
Proof: The third party is willing to share its resources422
among the MNOs based on proportional fairness by ensuring423
that a minimum profit gain will be achieved, at the same time.424
To that end, it calculates a reservation price, which is the425
minimum price that the third party will accept from an MNO426
to lease a specific bandwidth. The maximum number of PRBs427
that the nth MNO can offload to the mth SC is given by428
N lPRBn,m =
blres,n,m · xln,m∑
n∈N
∑
l∈L
blres,n,m · xln,m
·NmaxPRB. (7)
Finally, by using (5) and (7) in (4), the reservation price for429
offloading traffic is calculated. 430
The reservation price in (6) is not the price that the MNOs431
will propose to lease their requested capacity, although it is432
a threshold price that the third party uses to eliminate all the433
offers that are less than the accepted. The reservation price can434
be either announced or unknown to the MNOs. The reservation435
price means that the seller would rather withhold the capacity436
if the proposed bids are too low (i.e., lower than the reservation437
price), and given this price, the auction process can be acceler-438
ated since the set of prices that are lower than the reservation439
price can be discarded.440
2) MNOs’ Objective: The objective of each MNO is the441
maximization of its financial profits. The maximization of the442
profits of the nth MNO is defined as the revenue from switching443
off its BS minus the winning bids for leasing the requested444
capacity from the third party. Therefore, the profit (cost gain)445
can be written as446
f2(x) = CGn = CBS · xn −
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xln,m · bln,m (8)
with 447
xn =
∏
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∀n ∈ N (9)
and CBS being the cost of a BS, whose model is also presented 448
in [23], provided that 449
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀ l ∈ L. (10)
At this point, let us recall that an operator is able to switch 450
off its BS if it wins in an auction in all the SCs, a condition that 451
is represented by the product in (9). The product is equal to 1 452
only when the nth MNO wins in M auctions in respective SCs; 453
otherwise, it is 0. 454
The MNOs are willing to participate in the auction and lease 455
bandwidth resources from a third party if they guarantee a mini- 456
mum profit gain. Consequently, they introduce a minimum pro- 457
fit, which is described as a percentage of their total costs, i.e., 458
CGminn = z · CBS, 0 < z < 1. (11)
The bidding strategy of the MNOs, along with the proposed 459
bids, depend on the minimum profit gain and the operation costs 460
of the BSs. However, the cost gain can be attained if and only 461
if the nth MNO wins in M auctions and is able to lease the 462
requested capacity. In addition, since we consider uniform traf- 463
fic in the macro cell, we conclude that the bids in the different 464
SCs must be equal and proportional to the corresponding traffic. 465
Thus, the maximum bid price for offloading the traffic in the 466
mth cell is calculated as 467
bLn,m =
(1 − z) · CBS
M
. (12)
Similarly, the minimum bidding price is a proportional value 468
of the maximum one, which is given by 469
b0n,m = v ·
(1 − z) · CBS
M
(13)
where v ∈ (0, 1). The bidding values of the remaining L− 1 470
levels can be calculated based on (3), depending on the maxi- 471
mum bid value and the relation between the outage tolerance of 472
the MNOs and the discount they can be offered for the lower 473
requested bandwidth. 474
3) Overall Objective: The overall objective of the network 475
is the minimization of the energy consumption. This can be 476
attained by reducing the number of active BSs, given that the 477
BSs are responsible for the major part of energy consumption 478
in the network. The network energy consumption E[E] is 479
f3(x)=E[E]=
∑
n∈N
E [EBSn ] · (1−xn)+M · E[ESC] (14)
where E[EBSn ] and E[ESC] represent the energy consumption 480
of BS and SC, respectively. 481
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The combinatorial auction formulation should include all the482
objectives of the participating entities. To capture the trade-off483
between the objectives, the multiobjective optimization [24] is484
employed. The target is to find a subset of acceptable solutions485
according to a set of objectives. In general terms, the objectives486
may be conflicting, and consequently, a single global optimum487
may not exist. Hence, the notion of an optimum set x∗ becomes488
very important. Some relevant definitions are given in the489
following.490
Definition 1: Given the three objectives, f1(x), f2(x), and491
f3(x), and provided that x1 and x2 are two decision variables,492
then x1 is said to be the Pareto dominant, and is denoted x1 493
x2 if and only if fi(x1) ≥ fi(x2) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and fj(x1) >494
fj(x2), for at least one index j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.495
Definition 2: x∗ is said to be Pareto optimal (or nondom-496
inated), if there is no other x, so that x dominates x∗. The497
set of all Pareto solutions in the decision space is called the498
Pareto optimal set and the image of the Pareto optimal set in499
the objective space is called the Pareto optimal front.500
Based on the aforementioned definitions, the ILP multiobjec-AQ3 501
tive optimization problem can be formulated as follows.502
Definition 3: The allocation problem is to determine the503
optimal solution {xln,m} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M, and ∀ l ∈ L that504
maximizes the distinctive objectives of the involved parties in505
the auction, subject to capacity and offloading targets506
P1 : max [CGSC, CGn, −E[E]] (15)
s.t.∑
n∈N
∑
l∈L
xln,m ·N lPRBn,m ≤ NmaxPRB ∀m ∈ M (16)
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M (17)
bln,m ≥ blres,n,m ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M ∀ l ∈ L (18)
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M ∀ l ∈ L. (19)
The constraint in (16) ensures that the total number of507
allocated resources does not exceed their availability, constraint508
(17) ensures that only one bid of the nth MNO in the mth SC509
can be the winning bid among the l different ones, constraint510
(18) ensures that the bids are higher than the reservation price,511
and constraint (19) ensures the integrality of the binary variable.512
The objectives of the proposed optimization formulation are513
contradictory. The maximization of the third party income does514
not imply the BSs switching off, whereas the energy objective515
does not ensure the third party’s interests. The maximization516
of the financial gains of the third party may lead to additional517
economic losses from the MNOs’ perspective since the maxi-518
mization of this objective may lead to a resource allocation that519
does not imply the deactivation of BSs.520
Exploiting the fact that the BSs are responsible for the major521
part of the energy consumption, the third objective of the prob-522
lem f3(x) can be transformed into a constraint. Energy con-523
sumption is minimized when the maximum number of MNOs524
switches off their BSs after winning in M auctions, a condition525
represented by the product in (9). Thus, the problem P1 is526
transformed into a simpler formulation in (20), and at the same 527
time, the energy consumption objective is not neglected, in 528
contrast to former works [17], where only the maximization of 529
the third party’s income is considered. The equivalent problem 530
is as follows: 531
P2 : max [CGSC, CGn] (20)
s.t. ∏
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N (21)
∑
n∈N
∑
l∈L
xln,m ·N lPRBn,m ≤ NmaxPRB ∀m ∈ M (22)
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M (23)
bln,m ≥ blres,n,m ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M ∀ l ∈ L (24)
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M ∀ l ∈ L. (25)
The objective function (20) aims at maximizing the financial 532
gain of both the third party and the MNOs. Constraint (21) 533
ensures that an operator either wins in one auction in the M 534
SCs (and switches off its BS) or loses in all the auctions (keeps 535
its BS active). Thus, this constraint ensures the minimization 536
of the energy consumption given by (14) since the selected 537
resource allocation leads to the highest number of switched-off 538
BSs, while at the same time achieving the increase in MNOs 539
and third party’s income. Constraints (22)–(25) are the same as 540
(16)–(19), respectively. 541
The multiobjective problem P2 belongs to the class 542
NP-Complete since it is equivalent to the 0–1 knapsack prob- 543
lem, which is a well-known problem in combinatorial optimiza- 544
tion. For the NP-hard problems, an optimal solution is difficult 545
to be found due to the large number of variables [24]. However, 546
there are different solutions that represent the best feasible state 547
of the investigated system, e.g., the best resource allocation 548
for the deactivation of the highest number of BSs. To find the 549
best possible representation or a good approximation of these 550
optimal solutions that are widely known as the Pareto optimal 551
set or as the optimal Pareto front and to overcome the high 552
complexity of multiobjective problems, metaheuristic methods 553
(also sometimes called genetics) have become a very active 554
research area, and several algorithms have been proposed [25], 555
[26]. Although, the metaheuristic algorithms do not guarantee 556
that this approximation is the optimal, the solutions are still 557
good and near optimal.4 558
The metaheuristic algorithm that finds the Pareto solution 559
for our multiobjective optimization problem works on a set 560
of possible combinations of the decision variables [24]. The 561
basic definition of the Pareto front is that it consists of exactly 562
those point solutions that are not dominated by any other point. 563
The different objectives cannot be optimized simultaneously. 564
Thus, first, the solutions that maximize the MNOs’s income 565
and the third party’s economic gains are calculated separately. 566
4For the sake of simplicity, we use the term “Pareto front” throughout this
paper to refer to the obtained solutions through metaheuristics.
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Obviously, these solutions that maximize the cost gains of the567
MNOs and the third-party always belong to the Pareto front568
and, in fact, they are its endpoints. A simple algorithm to569
find the other solutions (if any) on the Pareto front begins by570
sorting the solutions according to one of the objectives, e.g.,571
third party’s income. The algorithm then starts with the point572
with the maximum gain for the third party and continues to573
the successive solutions in order of increasing third party’s cost574
until the solutions with higher cost gain value for the operators575
is found. This solution is then added to the Pareto front, and the576
search is restarted from it.577
Through the use of metaheuristics, the problem can be solved578
efficiently and quickly for a relatively small number of MNOs579
and SCs [25], [27], [28]. This assertion cannot be concluded580
and generalized for large networks. In the investigated network581
configuration with 5 MNOs, 15 SCs, and 9 bidding levels, the582
runtime of the solution is very short. At this point, let us clarify583
that the numbers selected for the MNOs and the SCs are based584
on the most typical and realistic scenarios in recent studies [18],585
[19] since the most common scenarios in European countries586
involve three to four MNOs, and 15 SCs can cover the service587
are of one macro BS.588
D. Pricing Strategy589
Having defined the ILP model, we now illustrate the payment590
rule, which is of crucial importance for the realization of the591
auction for the third party. The VCG payment induces all592
the users to reveal their actual valuations for the requested593
bandwidth. In the VCG mechanism, the third party charges the594
bidders (MNOs) with a price for the requested capacity. For595
example, an MNO who requires large bandwidth will have to596
pay a high price since its request results in dissatisfying other597
MNOs who lose in the auction because of the limited capacity598
resources and will not be able to offload their traffic.599
Let us denote by pln,m the price paid by the MNO n to the600
third party for the allocated capacity of the mth SC. The payoff601
function for bidder n that represents the difference between the602
gain of the MNO attained through the BS switching off and603
the true valuation minus the paid price (let us recall that in the604
truthful auction uln,m = bln,m) is605
Ui =
⎧⎨
⎩
CGi +
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
uli,m −
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
pli,m, if i is selected
−CBS, otherwise.
(26)
The payment rule for each MNO can be defined as follows:606
pli,m =
∑
n∈N\{i}
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
(
xli,m
){−i} · bli,m
−
⎛
⎝ ∑
n∈N\{i}
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xli,m · bli,m
−
∑
n∈N\{i}
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xli,m · bli,m
⎞
⎠ (27)
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
where the first term is the aggregate valuation of the allocated 607
resources, (xln,m)
{−i}
, when MNO i does not participate at all 608
in the auction. The second term is the aggregate valuation of the 609
allocation xln,m of all MNOs other than i, when i participates 610
in the auction. Next, we prove that our optimized auction 611
mechanism possesses two important properties: 1) truthfulness 612
and 2) individual rationality. 613
Proposition 2 (Truthfulness): The payment rule defined in 614
(27) satisfies the truthfulness property. 615
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B in the supple- 616
mental file.  617
Proposition 3 (Individual Rationality): The payment rule 618
defined in (27) satisfies the individual rationality property, and 619
all bidders are guaranteed to obtain nonnegative utility. 620
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C in the supple- 621
mental file.  622
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 623
This section is composed of three parts. First, we explain 624
the simulation scenario employed both for the multiobjective 625
optimization and the system-level simulations. Second, we 626
present the results regarding the estimation of the Pareto front 627
for the multiobjective optimization solved by using the Matlab 628
tools. Finally, we show a performance comparison between 629
the proposed scheme and two state-of-the-art schemes with the 630
development of a custom-made C simulator. 631
A. Simulation Scenario 632
The simulation scenario corresponds to a dense HetNet de- 633
ployment, such as a university campus or an urban area. More 634
specifically, our scenario focuses on a cell served by the BSs of 635
N = 5 MNOs and M = 15 SCs that cover the whole cell area. 636
In our experiments, we consider various scenarios, wherein the 637
MNOs have different traffic volumes (i.e., ρ), different bidding 638
strategies (i.e., nontolerant, linear, and tolerant), different cost 639
requirements (i.e., z), and different bidding levels (i.e., L). 640
The system-level simulations are based on Monte Carlo exper- 641
iments, and the presented results focus on the night zone for 642
the duration of one year.5 The set of parameters is provided 643
in Table I. 644
To assess the performance of our scheme, we compare 645
the proposed multiobjective auction-base switching-off strat- 646
egy (referred to as MAS), to two benchmark solutions: 1) an 647
auction-based switching-off scheme, wherein the income of the 648
5Note that the results are calculated for the case of one macro cell, but they
can be easily extended to extended configurations. Furthermore, we consider
the period of one year since the yearly traffic is considered stable [30].
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Fig. 6. Estimation of Pareto front solutions. (a) Estimated Pareto front forAQ4
multiple MNOs’ requirements, L = 2 and linear bidding strategy. (b) Estimated
Pareto front for multiple bidding strategies, L = 2, and z = 0.1.
third party is the unique objective to be maximized (referred649
as ISO) [17]; and 2) a baseline scenario with full operational650
topology (FOT), where none of the BSs is switched off.651
B. Estimation of the Pareto Front652
Here, we present the Pareto front analysis. In this set of653
experiments, we assume that all operators have the same traffic654
volume equal to the maximum possible traffic load, i.e., ρn = 1.655
In addition, we assume that each MNO submits three different656
bids, corresponding to L = 2, to the third party.657
Fig. 6 shows the Pareto front solutions achieved by solving658
the proposed multiobjective problem for different minimum659
financial gains with the same bidding strategy [see Fig. 6(a)]660
and different bidding strategies with the same minimum profit661
requirement [see Fig. 6(b)]. In both figures, the third party’s662
annual financial gain that can be attained by leasing its re-663
sources to one MNO is represented in the x-axis, and the annual664
economic profits of one MNO are given in y-axis.665
In Fig. 6(a), the set of optimal solutions is shown for the666
linear bidding strategy. Note that the stochastic search per-667
formed by means of the metaheuristic algorithm succeeds in668
estimating a Pareto front for the given parameters of the studied 669
problem. As expected, in all the different cases, the higher the 670
third party’s income (f1(x)), the lower the financial gain of 671
the MNOs (f2(x)). Thus, the Pareto front is monotonically 672
decreasing, meaning that the improvement of one objective 673
leads to the deterioration of the other objective, and there is 674
no feasible global solution maximizing all the objectives. A 675
second observation relies on the motivation of the MNOs to 676
maximize their economic gains, which is a fact that can be 677
explored through the parameter z that reflects the requirements 678
of the minimum profit gain, denoted in (11). As it is plotted 679
in the figure, the greedy behavior of the MNOs for higher cost 680
gains (z = 0.5) leads to lower income for the third party and, 681
at the same time, a lower number of achievable solutions. This 682
result is of significant importance since a greedy behavior from 683
the MNOs’ perspective will produce lower bids that may not be 684
accepted by the third party; thus, the MNOs will not be able to 685
offload their whole traffic. The selection of a proper value of the 686
parameter z helps the operators to decide whether it is profitable 687
for them to bid by taking into account their financial needs, 688
and by observing Fig. 6(a), we conclude that lower values of 689
z lead to higher income for the two involved parties. To provide 690
further insights for our approach, let us also highlight that, in 691
a realistic scenario with a large number of macro BSs, the cost 692
gains for the MNOs and the third party are significantly higher. 693
For example, by applying the proposed switching off technique 694
to the central area of London where an MNO may have up to 695
500 deployed BSs [31], the economic gains may reach up to 696
∼12.500 C for the MNO and up to ∼25.000 C for the third 697
party. 698
In continuation, Fig. 6(b) illustrates the Pareto front by 699
examining different bidding strategies for the case of z = 0.1. 700
Again, we observe that the attained solutions are decreasing 701
monotonically. Moreover, as we see, the more tolerant the 702
bidding strategy of the MNOs, the higher financial gains for the 703
involved parties. This important insight can be easily explained 704
by taking into account the fact that a nontolerant MNO is more 705
greedy; thus, it requests more capacity for the same bids with 706
respect to a tolerant MNO, as shown in Fig. 5. As a result, 707
the third party may lose its incentive to lease the bandwidth, 708
and the economic benefits will be reduced for the MNOs and 709
the SC network. It is noted that the tolerant bidding strategy 710
offers better solutions due to the leasing of more resources and 711
the switching off of higher number of BSs, whereas the linear 712
bidding strategy implies an intermediate solution between the 713
extreme cases. Hence, along with the minimum guaranteed 714
profit, the bidding strategy is also an important indicator that 715
affects the decision of MNOs on bidding. 716
C. Numerical Results 717
Here, the performance results with regard to 718
telecommunication-oriented (network throughput and energy 719
efficiency) and cost-oriented (annual cost and income gains) 720
metrics are shown. In this set of experiments, we study a more 721
realistic scenario, where the MNOs have different traffic vol- 722
umes and, thus, different requirements and outcomes, when 723
our proposed algorithm is applied. According to recent studies 724
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Fig. 7. Annual energy efficiency for z = 0.1 and different bidding strategies.
(a) Tolerant bidding strategy. (b) Nontolerant bidding strategy.
[18], in most European countries, there are usually up to725
two telecommunication companies holding the major part726
of the market share, up to two smaller operators serving an727
intermediate portion of the users, and finally, up to one smaller728
MNO with a very small slice of the market. By exploiting these729
interesting findings, we consider the scenario in which two730
MNOs (i.e., BS1 and BS2) are fully loaded (ρ1 = ρ2 = 1.0),731
two operators (i.e., BS3 and BS4) have relatively lower traffic732
with ρ3 = ρ4 = 0.7, and the fifth MNO (denoted by BS5)733
has very low traffic (ρ5 = 0.3). The results presented in the734
following are calculated for an operating point on the Pareto735
front that is assumed to satisfy all the involved parties in the736
auction. We would like to highlight that the selection of a737
solution among the Pareto front solutions can be either derived738
through agreements between the involved parties or another739
distinguished entity may select it.740
1) Telecommunication Metrics: Fig. 7 presents the total741
network energy efficiency versus L for tolerant [see Fig. 7(a)]742
and nontolerant [see Fig. 7(b)] bidding strategies. The number743
of switched-off BSs of every algorithm is also shown in the744
plot (right y-axis), along with the percentage gains in terms745
of energy efficiency of our approach compared with the state-746
of-the-art works. First, we observe that the energy efficiency747
achieved by the MAS scheme increases with the number of748
levels for tolerant and nontolerant bidding since the biggest749
Fig. 8. Annual energy efficiency for different bidding levels and strategies.
variety of the proposed bids (higher number of levels) implies 750
a higher number of choices for the resource allocation. Another 751
important remark is that MAS significantly outperforms the 752
baseline scenario, FOT, (where no BS is switched off), and 753
the ISO algorithm. The better performance of our proposal in 754
terms of energy efficiency is justified by the higher number 755
of switched-off BSs as this is highlighted also in the plots. 756
As we have already mentioned in Section III-C, the goal of 757
our proposal lies in maximizing the energy efficiency, an ob- 758
jective neglected in the auction-based works of the literature, 759
whereby only the maximization of the third party’s income 760
was considered. Comparing the behavior of our algorithm in 761
the two figures, it can be observed that the tolerant bidding 762
strategy achieves more considerable gains with respect to the 763
nontolerant bidding, mainly due to the deactivation of many 764
underutilized BSs in the network. These results emphasize 765
the role of the bidding strategy and the number of bidding 766
levels on the achievable energy efficiency, thus providing the 767
necessary insights to the MNOs to select the most appropriate 768
strategy based on their interests. In Fig. 8, the conclusions of 769
Fig. 7(b) and (a) are better illustrated since the comparison 770
between the three schemes and the different bidding strategies 771
is more clearly shown. Finally, we should mention that the 772
results of linear bidding are not shown here for simplicity, given 773
that the achieved gains range between the two aforementioned 774
cases. 775
Along with the total network energy efficiency performance, 776
it is interesting to study the individual energy efficiency gains 777
of the different MNOs. To that end, the individual gains for 778
the specific (but representative) case of z = 0.1 and the two 779
different bidding strategies are quantified in Table II, where 780
interesting conclusions can be extracted. In particular, inde- 781
pendently of the bidding strategy and the number of L, the 782
ISO scheme is beneficial only for the group of operators that 783
switch off their BSs, who are always the same (MNO1 and 784
MNO2), whereas the rest of the operators always keep their 785
BSs active. More specifically, the MNOs that switch off their 786
BSs theoretically achieve infinite energy efficiency, as they 787
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TABLE II
OPERATOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY (X 104 Mbits/Joule) WITH RESPECT TO THE FOT SCHEME FOR z = 0.1
Fig. 9. (a) Normalized throughput for different bidding levels and strategies.
(b) Number of lacking PRBs.
have their traffic served at zero energy cost, whereas the active788
operators serve their own traffic without improving their situa-789
tion. The proposed MAS eliminates this unfairness by offering790
the chance to more MNOs to switch off their BSs, providing791
them with extra incentives to participate in the auction. The792
individual gains are remarkable of our proposal for both the793
MNOs and the whole network.794
Despite the importance of the energy efficiency results, the795
deactivation of the BSs in the network and the traffic offloading796
to the SCs potentially implies loss of connections. To that797
end, we study the normalized throughput that represents the798
percentage of served connections in the system. In Fig. 9(a),799
it can be observed that, as the number of switched-off BSs800
increases, the MAS approach experiences small losses (around801
5% and 3% for tolerant and nontolerant bidding, respectively). 802
The degraded performance is explained by the high number 803
of deactivated BSs, leading to the service of all the traffic 804
mainly by the SC network (since at most one BS remains 805
active). The MNOs are able to decide whether the throughput 806
performance can be sacrificed to achieve energy efficiency, or 807
even small losses are prohibitive (thus, a tolerant strategy is not 808
acceptable). The results in terms of lacking PRBs are given 809
in Fig. 9(b). As it is observed, a larger number of PRBs are 810
lacking, when the MAS strategy is applied. In our case, there 811
are different reasons for the degraded throughput performance. 812
The unserved users exist because either lower bids (thus, fewer 813
PRBs) are selected or the overall PRBs are not adequate for the 814
total offloaded traffic. However, the impact on the throughput is 815
negligible, as it was shown in Fig. 9(a). 816
2) Cost Metrics: The total annual network cost and the 817
individual annual gains for the operators and the third party, 818
compared with the state-of-the-art algorithm and having as a 819
benchmark the FOT scheme, are presented in Figs. 10 and 12, 820
respectively. 821
The annual network cost is given versus the different number 822
of bidding levels and for the tolerant [see Fig. 10(a)] and 823
nontolerant [see Fig. 10(b)] bidding strategies, respectively. 824
The total network cost is the sum of the average cost of all 825
MNOs and the third party for the operation of all infrastructures 826
(i.e., the active BSs and SCs). The first observation is that the 827
network cost is the same for level pairs (l = 3 and l = 5) and 828
(l = 7 and l = 9) for the MAS algorithm, due to the number 829
of switched-off BSs that is the same for the two cases. The 830
MAS scheme achieves a considerable reduction up to 94% 831
and 96% for tolerant bidding, when compared with ISO and 832
FOT schemes, respectively. For the case of nontolerant bidding 833
strategy, the cost reduction is lower. This result is explained by 834
the fact that MNOs are more greedy, and in their attempt to 835
increase their economic gains, they do not offer high bids for 836
the requested capacity. As a consequence, the third party does 837
not accept the allocation of resources to low prices, and some 838
BSs may not be switched off. Concerning the ISO scheme, we 839
observe that the total annual cost is not affected by the different 840
bidding levels since, in ISO auction, only one bid is offered 841
based on the maximum traffic expectations, and fewer BSs are 842
deactivated. A clear comparison between MAS, for tolerant and 843
nontolerant bidding, and ISO is given in Fig. 11, where the 844
annual network cost behavior is highlighted. 845
The individual revenue of each MNO and the third party is 846
plotted in Fig. 12. We may observe that, similar to the energy 847
efficiency gains, the ISO scheme provides financial gains only 848
to particular operators (MNO1 and MNO2) and particularly to 849
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Fig. 10. Annual network cost for z = 0.1 and different bidding strategies.
(a) Tolerant bidding strategy. (b) Nontolerant bidding strategy.
Fig. 11. Annual network cost for different bidding levels and strategies.
the MNOs that switch off their networks, whereas the economic850
gains of the remaining operators are zero compared with the851
FOT scheme since these MNOs keep their BSs active and serve852
Fig. 12. Annual cost gain for z = 0.1 and different bidding strategies.
(a) Tolerant bidding strategy. (b) Nontolerant bidding strategy.
their own traffic without having any benefit from the auction. 853
On the other hand, for the proposed MAS approach, more 854
operators are able to have economic benefits, independently of 855
the particular number of levels. Furthermore, as the number of 856
bidding levels increases, the MAS algorithm achieves higher 857
financial gains for the operators due to the higher number 858
of combinations of bids offered. In addition, for the tolerant 859
bidding strategy [see Fig. 12(a)], the economic gains are higher 860
compared with the nontolerant behavior [see Fig. 12(b)]. 861
D. Discussion 862
Based on the analysis in Sections IV-B and IV-C, we have 863
shown that the proposed MAS scheme outperforms the state-of- 864
the-art approaches in terms of energy efficiency (network and 865
individual), annual network cost, and individual cost gains. In 866
addition, it achieves balanced results for the MNOs with respect 867
to the individual energy efficiency and cost gains. Furthermore, 868
through a performance assessment, we have identified the sig- 869
nificance of the bidding behavior, the number of levels, and pa- 870
rameter z. In particular, better performance results are attained 871
in terms of energy efficiency, aggregate network cost, and indi- 872
vidual cost gains, when a higher number of levels are chosen 873
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and through tolerant bidding. Moreover, higher values of z874
achieve lower gains for both the MNOs and the third party. Fi-875
nally, although minor losses may appear in terms of throughput,876
the attained benefits with respect to energy efficiency, individ-877
ual and network cost gains are remarkable and are adequate for878
giving the necessary incentives to the MNOs and the third party879
to apply the proposed auction-based switching-off strategy.880
V. CONCLUSION881
In this paper, motivated by the low BS utilization during882
the night and the coexistence of multiple MNOs and third-883
party SCs in the same area, we proposed a novel auction-based884
offloading and switching-off algorithm that achieves energy885
savings and cost reduction by encouraging MNOs to offload886
their traffic and switch off the redundant BSs. Moreover, by887
employing auction tools and novel bidding strategies, we intro-888
duced a switching-off scheme that allows the MNOs to reduce889
their expenditures. The proposed scheme has been evaluated890
in terms of energy efficiency and cost metrics for various891
conditions (different bidding levels and behaviors). The results892
have shown that our proposal can significantly improve the893
network energy efficiency, guaranteeing at the same time the894
throughput. Regarding the financial costs/gains, the proposed895
scheme provides higher cost benefits and fairness compared896
with the state-of-the-art algorithms. It provides also interesting897
insights concerning the rules and behaviors that the MNOs898
should follow when they participate in an auction strategy. The899
study of other schemes for the solution of the problem (such900
as backwards induction) and the potential trade-offs would be901
interesting research line for future works.902
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Abstract—The emerging data traffic demand has caused a mas-6
sive deployment of network infrastructure, including macro base7
stations (BSs) and small cells (SCs), leading to increased energy8
consumption and expenditures. However, the network underuti-9
lization during low traffic periods (e.g., night zone) enables the10
mobile network operators (MNOs) to save energy by having their11
traffic served by third-party SCs, thus being able to switch off12
their BSs. In this paper, we propose a novel market approach to13
foster the opportunistic utilization of the unexploited SCs capacity,14
where the MNOs, instead of requesting the maximum capacity15
to meet their highest traffic expectations, offer a set of bids re-16
questing different amounts of resources from the third-party SCs17
at lower costs. Motivated by the conflicting financial interests of18
the MNOs and the third party, the restricted capacity of the SCs19
that is not adequate to carry the whole traffic in multioperator20
scenarios, and the necessity for energy-efficient solutions, we in-21
troduce a combinatorial auction framework, which includes 1) a22
bidding strategy, 2) a resource-allocation scheme, and 3) a pricing23
rule. We propose a multiobjective framework as an energy- and24
cost-efficient solution for the resource-allocation problem, and we25
provide extensive analytical and experimental results to estimate26
the potential energy and cost savings that can be achieved. In27
addition, we investigate the conditions under which the MNOs28
and the third-party companies should take part in the proposed29
auction.30
Index Terms—Auction, energy efficiency, game theory, green31
networking, heterogeneous networks (HetNets), multiobjective op-32
timization, offloading, switching off.33
I. INTRODUCTION34
A. Motivation35
The rapid expansion of mobile services, along with the36
emerging demand for multimedia applications, driven by the37
widespread use of laptops, tablets, and smart devices, has led38
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to an impressive growth of data traffic during the last few 39
years. Global mobile data traffic is expected to increase nearly 40
tenfold, reaching 24.3 EB per month by 2019 [1]. Hence, 41
mobile network operators (MNOs1) seek to extend their in- 42
frastructure by installing more base stations (BSs). In an effort 43
to increase the capacity of their network and meet these press- 44
ing traffic demands, they also lease capacity and bandwidth 45
resources from third parties, who deploy low-powered small- 46
cell (SC) networks to provide enhanced services via traffic 47
offloading from macro BSs to SCs during peak hours [2]. For 48
instance, Nokia Networks [3] has recently built networks of 49
interconnected SCs, enabling operators to extend the coverage 50
and increase the capacity of existing macro networks. The 51
involvement of various entities of corporate nature with differ- 52
ent financial goals generates a new ecosystem with interesting 53
dynamics to be studied. To that end, in [4], the economics 54
of offloading are investigated, whereas auction theory is used 55
to model economic transactions between conflicting parties in 56
several works [5]–[7] through offloading schemes with auction- 57
based resource-allocation problems. 58
The dense heterogeneous networks (HetNets) imply sig- 59
nificant increase in the capital and operational expenditures 60
(CapEx and OpEx) of MNOs [8], and as a result, there is a 61
strong motivation to investigate energy-efficient solutions to 62
bring down the energy consumption and the cost of networks. 63
This goal can be accomplished through the switching off of the 64
underutilized nodes when the traffic is significantly low. Since 65
the BSs are the most power hungry and expensive components 66
of the networks [9], the research community has shifted toward 67
the investigation of BS switching-off schemes [10]–[15]. De- 68
spite their promising results, these works examine only one tier 69
of macro BSs, whereas the presence of multiple MNOs raises 70
new challenges and open issues. 71
The SC deployment in current HetNets can be the key to 72
implementing novel energy and cost-efficient solutions. By 73
encouraging the traffic offloading from BSs to SCs during low 74
traffic periods, when the SC resources are most likely to remain 75
unused, part of the BS infrastructure can be switched off. Given 76
that the energy consumption of the BSs is considerably higher 77
with respect to the SCs, even when the traffic load is low, such 78
solutions can yield high energy gains for the MNOs. Thus, 79
offloading can be exploited to concentrate the users to the SCs 80
1The terms “MNO” and “operator” will be used interchangeably in the
remainder of this paper.
0018-9545 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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and allow the BSs with no traffic to be switched off. However,81
despite the potential gains of the opportunistic exploitation of82
the capacity of SCs and the deactivation of the redundant BSs83
during low traffic conditions, very few research works exist in84
the literature so far.85
An overview of the existing techniques in energy-efficient86
network planning is presented in [16], highlighting the advan-87
tages and the shortcomings of the algorithms and revealing88
the open issues that should be further studied in the field of89
HetNets and operators’ collaboration. In the same context, in90
[17], an auction-based offloading scheme is proposed for the BS91
switching off, where the operators submit a bidding value, and a92
third party’s income optimization approach is followed to solve93
the resource-allocation problem. However, only a particular94
network configuration is considered, where it is assumed that95
the SC capacity is sufficient to serve the traffic of the network,96
allowing the switching off of all the BSs.97
Despite the clear benefits of the BSs switching off via of-98
floading, the presence of multiple MNOs in the same area [18]99
would complicate the application of this scheme since the SCs100
may not be able to fully support the network traffic. Another101
limitation of the auction-based state-of-the-art works [5], [6],102
[17] consists in the fact that the MNOs propose a single103
bidding value for the requested capacity, based on the maximum104
predictions about the traffic that they are willing to offload.105
However, these predictions do not always correspond to the106
real traffic values, which can be significantly lower than the107
maximum values, leading to increased costs for the operators108
and inefficient use of the SC capacity resources.109
B. Contribution110
In this paper, motivated by the aforementioned issues, we111
propose a novel energy-efficient solution for dense HetNets,112
which considers the interests of the involved parties (MNOs and113
third party) and the time-varying traffic characteristics. More114
specifically, we introduce an offloading mechanism, where the115
operators lease the capacity of an SC network owned by a third116
party, to be able to switch off their BSs and maximize their117
energy efficiency, when the traffic demand is low. The MNOs118
request capacity from several SCs and can only switch off their119
BSs if all their requests are satisfied, enabling them to offload120
all their traffic to the SC network.121
To that end, the allocation of the SC resources among a122
set of competing MNOs is mathematically formulated as an123
auction. Since the exact resource requirements of the network124
are unknown beforehand, the MNOs employ past reports to125
predict the maximum expected traffic load. Then, exploiting126
the fact that, with a high probability, the actual traffic will127
be lower than the predicted maximum (especially during low128
traffic periods), the MNOs submit a set of bids to the SCs,129
requesting for lower capacity resources (with respect to the130
maximum estimated requirements). With this approach, the SC131
resources can be more efficiently utilized, and the MNOs are132
likely to pay a lower price for the leased capacity, taking a133
small risk of not being able to serve all users under some134
circumstances (i.e., when the traffic approaches the maximum135
predictions and the leased capacity is not sufficient). Our key136
contribution is to study this very interesting trade-off between 137
the potential energy and financial gains of this solution and 138
the risk of not fully satisfying all the users, thus providing the 139
MNOs with the necessary insights to decide whether it is prof- 140
itable to participate in the auction, depending on their tolerance 141
to the potential loss of some users. 142
In addition, the conflicting interests of the involved parties 143
are also taken into consideration. On the one hand, the MNOs 144
aim to reduce their energy consumption and expenditures by 145
offloading their traffic and switching off their BS infrastructure. 146
However, to deactivate a BS, all its traffic should be offloaded 147
to the SC network (i.e., the MNO should win in all the auctions 148
involving the particular BS). On the other hand, the third 149
party wants to maximize its income by leasing the maximum 150
possible amount for resources to the MNOs. However, the 151
resource allocation policy that maximizes the third party’s 152
income may not enable the operators to switch off their BSs. 153
Our proposed auction-based strategy takes into account these 154
conflicting interests to achieve a feasible, efficient, and energy- 155
saving resource-allocation scheme. 156
In summary, the contribution of this paper is described as 157
follows. 158
159
1) Bidding Strategy: We propose a novel bidding strategy, 160
where MNOs submit a set of bids (and not only one bid) 161
to the third party, requesting different capacity resources, 162
based on the predictions about their maximum traffic. The 163
diversity of bids allows more offloading opportunities, 164
which is profitable for both the MNOs and the third party. 165
2) Auction Design and Switching Off Decision: We design 166
an auction scheme that enables the efficient usage of SCs 167
resources under low traffic conditions. Our framework 168
motivates the MNOs to quantify their tolerance about 169
requesting fewer resources and form the different levels 170
of bids. We show that the proposed auction-based scheme 171
has two desirable properties: 1) truthfulness; and 2) indi- 172
vidual rationality. The mechanism is designed based on a 173
multiobjective framework, where the conflicting interests 174
of the involved parties are considered, to provide the 175
optimal solution that maximizes the economic profit of 176
both the third party and the MNOs and minimizes the 177
network energy consumption at the same time. 178
3) Performance Evaluation: We validate the theoretical 179
analysis of the multiobjective problem by computing 180
the Pareto front (i.e., the set of optimal) solutions and 181
assess the effectiveness of the proposed auction-based 182
switching-off algorithm. The analytical and simula- 183
tion results indicate the potential energy efficiency and 184
economic gains in the network and give the necessary 185
insights to the MNOs to decide whether it is beneficial 186
to enter in a resource allocation negotiation with the 187
third party. 188
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 189
system model is described in Section II. In Section III, we in- 190
troduce the auction-based optimization approach that is used for 191
the BSs’ switching-off decision. The performance evaluation is 192
provided in Sections IV and V concludes this paper. 193
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Fig. 1. Network configuration with one macro cell served by N MNOs and
covered by M third-party SCs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND OPERATION194
A. Network Configuration195
We consider an urban scenario, focusing on an area of a196
macro cell. In the macro cell, we assume that N MNOs provide197
coverage through their BSs, which are denoted by BSn, where198
n ∈ N = {1, . . . , N} characterizes the MNOn. Let us high-199
light that, in dense networks, due to legal regulations, MNOs200
are obligated to install their antennas and BSs on the same201
buildings; thus, we examine networks with collocated BSs [18].202
Moreover, in the macro cell, SCs, owned by a third party, are203
randomly distributed. Each SC is represented as SCm, where204
m ∈ M = {1, . . . ,M}. We assume that the number of SCs is205
adequate to cover the area of the macro cell [19]. As it will be206
explained in the following, the MNOs are motivated to offload207
their traffic to the third-party SCs by paying the corresponding208
price, thus enabling part of BS infrastructure to be switched209
off during low traffic conditions. The network configuration is210
shown in Fig. 1.211
B. Traffic Load Model212
In this paper, we adopt a realistic traffic pattern [20], [21]213
that corresponds to the maximum traffic per operator in a given214
cell. Fig. 2(a) plots the maximum traffic per hour, which is215
denoted by Loadmax(h), throughout the day.2 Without loss of216
generality, we focus on the time zone between 01:00 A.M. and217
09:00 A.M., when the traffic per BS is relatively low (i.e., less218
than 40 Mb/s, which corresponds to 35% of the cell’s capacity).219
The selection of the night zone may vary according to the traffic220
variations, and our algorithm can be adapted to different traffic221
conditions. In addition, we assume that the traffic volumes of222
different MNOs may be different, although they follow the223
same pattern. Hence, we define ρn ∈ [0, 1] as the percentage of224
each operator’s traffic load with respect to the maximum traffic225
for the respective hour. In this paper, we have used traffic data226
sets that include information of one operator for ten BSs during227
the period of one year, thus including weekends, weekdays,228
and day and night hours. To that end, the reports consists of229
various values for both low and high traffic. Provided that the230
2The parameter h can be dropped for the sake of simplicity.
Fig. 2. Traffic pattern scenario and real data traffic values. (a) Traffic load
during the 24-hour day. (b) Real data for traffic load patterns.
data sets had huge information, we classified the days of the 231
year into different periods of time (e.g., seasons, weekdays, 232
and weekends). Based on these real traffic reports and by 233
using simple statistical analysis, we have obtained the necessary 234
insights about the minimum, maximum, and average values of 235
the traffic load, and we have plotted some indicative numbers in 236
Fig. 2(b). Each one of the six values corresponds to the average 237
traffic that was observed in different days during the year. In 238
addition, we express the BS utilization as a percentage of the 239
total BS’s capacity resources for the extreme cases of minimum 240
and maximum traffic loads. The two values, i.e., Loadmin and 241
Loadmax, are very critical, and it is very important for the 242
MNOs to be able to predict them. 243
Unlike the existing works in the literature, where each MNO 244
places only one bid corresponding to the maximum capacity 245
requirements, in this paper, we propose that the MNOs place 246
multiple bids corresponding to different levels of the predicted 247
traffic load, as shown in Fig. 2(b). Thus, given the estimated 248
minimum and maximum traffic load levels and assuming that 249
the actual traffic values will, most probably, lie between these 250
extreme values, we are able to calculate different levels of 251
traffic. In this paper, we consider L+ 1 different traffic load 252
levels. The number of levels depends on the MNOs’ strategy 253
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Fig. 3. Traffic during the night zone and different levels of traffic estimation.
that will be further explained in the following. Each level l ∈254
L = {0, . . . , L} corresponds to traffic that is equal to255
Loadl = Loadmin + Load
max − Loadmin
L
· l
=
(
1 − l
L
)
· Loadmin + l
L
· Loadmax. (1)
Evidently, the two extreme values are Load0 = Loadmin and256
LoadL = Loadmax. Fig. 3 shows an example, depicting various257
traffic levels for a specific hour (h = 02 :00 A.M.). Based258
on the above, Appendix A of the supplemental file provides259
a theoretical estimation of the traffic that can be offloaded,260
explaining the process of mapping the users of the MNOs to261
the capacity of the SCs.262
III. AUCTION-BASED SWITCHING-OFF ALGORITHM263
Here, we present the combinatorial auction employed to264
select the MNOs that can offload their traffic to the SCs, thus265
being able to switch off their BSs. We provide the bidding strat-266
egy, and we formulate the integer linear programming model,267
which ensures the optimal allocation and the switching-off268
strategy for the auction. In addition, to ensure truthful bidding,269
the Vickrey—Clarke—Grooves (VCG) payment mechanism270
[22] is employed.271
A. Big Picture272
By considering the limited capacity of the SCs and the273
MNOs’ incentive to switch off their BSs, we use an auction-274
based mechanism to motivate the operators to offload the traffic275
to the third-party SC network. Fig. 4 illustrates the main idea of276
the scheme. In our proposal, both the MNOs and the third party277
take part in the decision process, each one having a separate278
role in the framework. On one hand, the MNOs act as buyers,279
who are willing to lease the SCs resources and opportunistically280
offload their traffic. On the other hand, the third party, acting as281
a seller, collects the bids, and through an auction, the subset of282
MNOs that can offload their traffic, is selected. The proposed283
auction-based switching-off scheme consists of three main284
Fig. 4. Auction illustration and proposed algorithm flowchart.
steps: bidding, allocation, and pricing, whose process and the 285
respective decision-makers (in parenthesis) are presented as fol- 286
lows. First, in the bidding phase (MNOs), the MNOs place their 287
bids to the third party according to the different values of the 288
requested bandwidth. Each bid includes the information of the 289
requested capacity and the corresponding price that the MNO is 290
willing to offer. Second, in the allocation step (third party and 291
MNOs), the third party collects the MNOs’ bids. The selection 292
of the optimal resource allocation can be derived through the so- 293
lution of the resource-allocation problem. Third, in the pricing 294
step (third party), the third party decides each winner’s payment 295
price, based on the resource allocation of the previous step. The 296
winning MNOs offload their whole traffic to the SCs and switch 297
off their BSs, whereas the losing bidders keep their BSs active. 298
B. Bidding Strategy 299
Each SCm of the third party (seller) has unexploited capacity 300
resources that is willing to lease to the MNOs. The MNOs 301
(buyers) want to offload their traffic to the SCs by requesting 302
specific capacity resources to lease, based on the predictions 303
of the traffic load. The number of the physical resource blocks 304
(PRBs) is calculated in Appendix A of the supplementary AQ1305
file. The MNOs valuate the requested resource N lPRBn,m at a 306
given price uln,m, unknown to the third party and the other 307
bidders, where l is the level of resources, n ∈ N refers to 308
the corresponding operator, and m ∈ M corresponds to the 309
specific SC that the MNO wants to lease the resources from. In 310
the proposed auction-based scheme, each operator submits a set 311
of bid pairs Bln,m = (bln,m, N lPRBn,m), representing the price 312
bln,m ≤ uln,m, which the nth MNO pays for leasing the capacity 313
N lPRBn,m from the mth SC. In general, these two values (i.e., 314
bln,m, u
l
n,m) may not necessarily be the same. However, in a 315
truthful auction such as the one that we have (the truthfulness 316
property of the auction will be explained in Section III-D), it 317
is proved that the private valuation and the bidding price are 318
equal; thus, bln,m = uln,m [5], [6]. After the reception bid pairs, 319
the selection of the subset of the MNOs, whose traffic can be 320
offloaded to the corresponding SCs, follows. 321
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Fig. 5. Bidding strategy versus tolerance function.AQ2
To gain further insights on the bidding strategy, let us322
consider the following example. Given the predicted expecta-323
tions about the traffic, each MNO m submits multiple bids,324
b0n,m, b
1
n,m, . . . , b
l
n,m, . . . , b
L
n,m, indicating the offered price for325
the requested number of PRBs. Through the different bid pairs,326
the MNOs actually reveal their outage probability tolerance.327
In particular, by leasing the maximum calculated number of328
PRBs (NLPRBn,m) for the highest bid b
L
n,m, the MNOs guarantee329
service to all their users. Controversially, by obtaining a smaller330
number of PRBs (e.g., N lPRBn,m with l < L), the MNO pays331
a smaller price at a risk of leaving some users in outage.332
The minimum number of requested PRBs N0PRBn,m constitutes333
an upper bound of the operator’s outage tolerance. Another334
parameter determined by each MNO is the number of levels.335
A higher number of levels results in more bid pairs, thus336
increasing the performance of the auction while inducing more337
communication overhead and higher computational complexity.338
To flexibly model the MNOs’ outage tolerance, we introduce339
a satisfaction function that represents the bidding value (which340
is equal to the valuation price) that the MNO is willing to341
pay for leasing a specific bandwidth. To that end, we define342
the number of lacking PRBs as the difference between the343
maximum number of PRBs minus the actually obtained PRBs344
allocated the MNO, given by345
N lPRBn,m,lack = N
L
PRBn,m
−N lPRBn,m . (2)
The satisfaction function is determined by the requested ca-346
pacity of each MNO and is monotonically decreasing with the347
number of lacking PRBs. We also consider that, for each MNO,348
there is a lower bound for the minimum number of requested349
PRBs, which minimizes the MNO’s satisfaction. This bound350
indicates that for fewer PRBs the MNO will not participate in351
the auction. Fig. 5 shows three examples of the outage tolerance352
function. Three bidding values are emphasized in the plot: The353
highest bid bLn,m, corresponding to the maximum requested354
capacity NLPRBn,m (with N lPRBn,m,lack = 0), the lowest bid355
b0n,m, and an intermediate value bln,m. As the number of lacking356
PRBs increases (depicted by the arrow direction in Fig. 5), the357
bid values decrease, and as a consequence, losses in terms of the358
served users may be observed. If the number of lacking PRBs359
exceeds N0PRBn,m,lack, the MNO will not participate in the auc-360
tion; thus, no bid lower than b0n,m will be submitted. The three 361
points (A, B, and C) marked in Fig. 5 correspond to the different 362
tolerance functions of three operators. An outage-tolerant MNO 363
(point C) requests for less bandwidth for the same bidding value 364
bln,m compared with a nontolerant MNO (point A) that still 365
requests high capacity from the third party. Hence, the nontol- 366
erant MNO places higher priority on guaranteeing user service, 367
whereas the outage-tolerant MNO is willing to sacrifice some 368
resources to increase its probability of winning the auction and 369
switching off its BS, thus enhancing energy efficiency. Finally, 370
point B corresponds to an intermediate bidding strategy defined 371
by a linear function between the two examined parameters. 372
The user outage tolerance function (keeping in mind that 373
bln,m = u
l
n,m) is modeled as3 374
bln,m = b
L
n,m −
bLn,m − b0n,m
NLPRBn,m −N0PRBn,m
·
(
N lPRBn,m
)δ
. (3)
The distinctive cases for the satisfaction curves are as 375
follows. 376
377
• Nontolerant MNO (Point A): For the nontolerant MNO, 378
the outage tolerance function is convex, with δ < 1. 379
• Average-tolerant MNO (Point B). There is a linear re- 380
lation between the bidding strategies and the outage 381
tolerance of the MNOs, by substituting δ = 1 in (3). 382
• Tolerant MNO (Point C). For the tolerant MNO, the 383
satisfaction function is concave, with δ > 1. 384
The parameter δ may obtain a wide range of values. The selec- 385
tion of a value equal to δ  1 corresponds to a strictly nontoler- 386
ant MNO, who decreases its bid requests very fast. In contrast, a 387
very high value of this indicative parameter (i.e., δ  1) would 388
lead to very slowly decreasing bidding values and, thus, to a 389
very tolerant operator. 390
C. Auction Formulation 391
By employing the properties of combinatorial auction theory, 392
we formulate the problem of the opportunistic offloading as 393
an auction. Each MNO n ∈ N places the corresponding bid 394
pairs Bln,m. Having received the bids, the third party selects 395
the subset of MNOs that maximizes the desired goals of all the 396
involved participants. We define xln,m as a binary decision vari- 397
able that indicates whether the corresponding bidder (MNO n) 398
is winner (xln,m = 1) or not (xln,m = 0) in the corresponding 399
SCm and for the lth bidding value. 400
The cost of using the SC infrastructure and the increased 401
consumed energy are the main objectives: the maximization 402
of the profits (the economic objectives of the third party and 403
the MNOs) and the minimization of the energy consumption 404
(the energy objective). In continuation, a detailed analysis of 405
the objectives of each party is presented. 406
1) Third Party’s Objective: The third party aims at maximiz- 407
ing its profit by leasing high volumes of the capacity of SCs at 408
3The values of b0n,m and bLn,m will be calculated in details in the succeeding
section, where the constraints and requirements posed by the MNOs and the
third party are given within the optimization framework.
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increased prices. The profit is defined as the difference of the409
MNOs’ winning bids minus its expenses (CapEx and OpEx).410
We define the financial gain of the SC network CGSC as411
f1(x) = CGSC =
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xln,m · bln,m −M · CSC (4)
where CSC is the cost of a SC, corresponding to the sum of its412
CapEx and the traffic-dependent OpEx. For the calculation of413
the SCs cost, the cost model presented in [23] is employed.414
To ensure its objective, the third party introduces a minimum415
profit, which is described as a function of its total cost, i.e.,416
CGminSC = y ·M · CSC, y > 0. (5)
Given the minimum profit, which is calculated by (5), we417
estimate the reservation price as follows.418
Proposition 1: The reservation price is defined as the mini-419
mum price that a seller would be willing to accept for leasing420
the corresponding bandwidth, i.e.,421
blres,n,m =
N lPRBn,m
NmaxPRB
· y ·M · CSC. (6)
Proof: The third party is willing to share its resources422
among the MNOs based on proportional fairness by ensuring423
that a minimum profit gain will be achieved, at the same time.424
To that end, it calculates a reservation price, which is the425
minimum price that the third party will accept from an MNO426
to lease a specific bandwidth. The maximum number of PRBs427
that the nth MNO can offload to the mth SC is given by428
N lPRBn,m =
blres,n,m · xln,m∑
n∈N
∑
l∈L
blres,n,m · xln,m
·NmaxPRB. (7)
Finally, by using (5) and (7) in (4), the reservation price for429
offloading traffic is calculated. 430
The reservation price in (6) is not the price that the MNOs431
will propose to lease their requested capacity, although it is432
a threshold price that the third party uses to eliminate all the433
offers that are less than the accepted. The reservation price can434
be either announced or unknown to the MNOs. The reservation435
price means that the seller would rather withhold the capacity436
if the proposed bids are too low (i.e., lower than the reservation437
price), and given this price, the auction process can be acceler-438
ated since the set of prices that are lower than the reservation439
price can be discarded.440
2) MNOs’ Objective: The objective of each MNO is the441
maximization of its financial profits. The maximization of the442
profits of the nth MNO is defined as the revenue from switching443
off its BS minus the winning bids for leasing the requested444
capacity from the third party. Therefore, the profit (cost gain)445
can be written as446
f2(x) = CGn = CBS · xn −
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xln,m · bln,m (8)
with 447
xn =
∏
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∀n ∈ N (9)
and CBS being the cost of a BS, whose model is also presented 448
in [23], provided that 449
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀ l ∈ L. (10)
At this point, let us recall that an operator is able to switch 450
off its BS if it wins in an auction in all the SCs, a condition that 451
is represented by the product in (9). The product is equal to 1 452
only when the nth MNO wins in M auctions in respective SCs; 453
otherwise, it is 0. 454
The MNOs are willing to participate in the auction and lease 455
bandwidth resources from a third party if they guarantee a mini- 456
mum profit gain. Consequently, they introduce a minimum pro- 457
fit, which is described as a percentage of their total costs, i.e., 458
CGminn = z · CBS, 0 < z < 1. (11)
The bidding strategy of the MNOs, along with the proposed 459
bids, depend on the minimum profit gain and the operation costs 460
of the BSs. However, the cost gain can be attained if and only 461
if the nth MNO wins in M auctions and is able to lease the 462
requested capacity. In addition, since we consider uniform traf- 463
fic in the macro cell, we conclude that the bids in the different 464
SCs must be equal and proportional to the corresponding traffic. 465
Thus, the maximum bid price for offloading the traffic in the 466
mth cell is calculated as 467
bLn,m =
(1 − z) · CBS
M
. (12)
Similarly, the minimum bidding price is a proportional value 468
of the maximum one, which is given by 469
b0n,m = v ·
(1 − z) · CBS
M
(13)
where v ∈ (0, 1). The bidding values of the remaining L− 1 470
levels can be calculated based on (3), depending on the maxi- 471
mum bid value and the relation between the outage tolerance of 472
the MNOs and the discount they can be offered for the lower 473
requested bandwidth. 474
3) Overall Objective: The overall objective of the network 475
is the minimization of the energy consumption. This can be 476
attained by reducing the number of active BSs, given that the 477
BSs are responsible for the major part of energy consumption 478
in the network. The network energy consumption E[E] is 479
f3(x)=E[E]=
∑
n∈N
E [EBSn ] · (1−xn)+M · E[ESC] (14)
where E[EBSn ] and E[ESC] represent the energy consumption 480
of BS and SC, respectively. 481
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The combinatorial auction formulation should include all the482
objectives of the participating entities. To capture the trade-off483
between the objectives, the multiobjective optimization [24] is484
employed. The target is to find a subset of acceptable solutions485
according to a set of objectives. In general terms, the objectives486
may be conflicting, and consequently, a single global optimum487
may not exist. Hence, the notion of an optimum set x∗ becomes488
very important. Some relevant definitions are given in the489
following.490
Definition 1: Given the three objectives, f1(x), f2(x), and491
f3(x), and provided that x1 and x2 are two decision variables,492
then x1 is said to be the Pareto dominant, and is denoted x1 493
x2 if and only if fi(x1) ≥ fi(x2) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and fj(x1) >494
fj(x2), for at least one index j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.495
Definition 2: x∗ is said to be Pareto optimal (or nondom-496
inated), if there is no other x, so that x dominates x∗. The497
set of all Pareto solutions in the decision space is called the498
Pareto optimal set and the image of the Pareto optimal set in499
the objective space is called the Pareto optimal front.500
Based on the aforementioned definitions, the ILP multiobjec-AQ3 501
tive optimization problem can be formulated as follows.502
Definition 3: The allocation problem is to determine the503
optimal solution {xln,m} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M, and ∀ l ∈ L that504
maximizes the distinctive objectives of the involved parties in505
the auction, subject to capacity and offloading targets506
P1 : max [CGSC, CGn, −E[E]] (15)
s.t.∑
n∈N
∑
l∈L
xln,m ·N lPRBn,m ≤ NmaxPRB ∀m ∈ M (16)
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M (17)
bln,m ≥ blres,n,m ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M ∀ l ∈ L (18)
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M ∀ l ∈ L. (19)
The constraint in (16) ensures that the total number of507
allocated resources does not exceed their availability, constraint508
(17) ensures that only one bid of the nth MNO in the mth SC509
can be the winning bid among the l different ones, constraint510
(18) ensures that the bids are higher than the reservation price,511
and constraint (19) ensures the integrality of the binary variable.512
The objectives of the proposed optimization formulation are513
contradictory. The maximization of the third party income does514
not imply the BSs switching off, whereas the energy objective515
does not ensure the third party’s interests. The maximization516
of the financial gains of the third party may lead to additional517
economic losses from the MNOs’ perspective since the maxi-518
mization of this objective may lead to a resource allocation that519
does not imply the deactivation of BSs.520
Exploiting the fact that the BSs are responsible for the major521
part of the energy consumption, the third objective of the prob-522
lem f3(x) can be transformed into a constraint. Energy con-523
sumption is minimized when the maximum number of MNOs524
switches off their BSs after winning in M auctions, a condition525
represented by the product in (9). Thus, the problem P1 is526
transformed into a simpler formulation in (20), and at the same 527
time, the energy consumption objective is not neglected, in 528
contrast to former works [17], where only the maximization of 529
the third party’s income is considered. The equivalent problem 530
is as follows: 531
P2 : max [CGSC, CGn] (20)
s.t. ∏
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N (21)
∑
n∈N
∑
l∈L
xln,m ·N lPRBn,m ≤ NmaxPRB ∀m ∈ M (22)
∑
l∈L
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M (23)
bln,m ≥ blres,n,m ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M ∀ l ∈ L (24)
xln,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈ M ∀ l ∈ L. (25)
The objective function (20) aims at maximizing the financial 532
gain of both the third party and the MNOs. Constraint (21) 533
ensures that an operator either wins in one auction in the M 534
SCs (and switches off its BS) or loses in all the auctions (keeps 535
its BS active). Thus, this constraint ensures the minimization 536
of the energy consumption given by (14) since the selected 537
resource allocation leads to the highest number of switched-off 538
BSs, while at the same time achieving the increase in MNOs 539
and third party’s income. Constraints (22)–(25) are the same as 540
(16)–(19), respectively. 541
The multiobjective problem P2 belongs to the class 542
NP-Complete since it is equivalent to the 0–1 knapsack prob- 543
lem, which is a well-known problem in combinatorial optimiza- 544
tion. For the NP-hard problems, an optimal solution is difficult 545
to be found due to the large number of variables [24]. However, 546
there are different solutions that represent the best feasible state 547
of the investigated system, e.g., the best resource allocation 548
for the deactivation of the highest number of BSs. To find the 549
best possible representation or a good approximation of these 550
optimal solutions that are widely known as the Pareto optimal 551
set or as the optimal Pareto front and to overcome the high 552
complexity of multiobjective problems, metaheuristic methods 553
(also sometimes called genetics) have become a very active 554
research area, and several algorithms have been proposed [25], 555
[26]. Although, the metaheuristic algorithms do not guarantee 556
that this approximation is the optimal, the solutions are still 557
good and near optimal.4 558
The metaheuristic algorithm that finds the Pareto solution 559
for our multiobjective optimization problem works on a set 560
of possible combinations of the decision variables [24]. The 561
basic definition of the Pareto front is that it consists of exactly 562
those point solutions that are not dominated by any other point. 563
The different objectives cannot be optimized simultaneously. 564
Thus, first, the solutions that maximize the MNOs’s income 565
and the third party’s economic gains are calculated separately. 566
4For the sake of simplicity, we use the term “Pareto front” throughout this
paper to refer to the obtained solutions through metaheuristics.
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Obviously, these solutions that maximize the cost gains of the567
MNOs and the third-party always belong to the Pareto front568
and, in fact, they are its endpoints. A simple algorithm to569
find the other solutions (if any) on the Pareto front begins by570
sorting the solutions according to one of the objectives, e.g.,571
third party’s income. The algorithm then starts with the point572
with the maximum gain for the third party and continues to573
the successive solutions in order of increasing third party’s cost574
until the solutions with higher cost gain value for the operators575
is found. This solution is then added to the Pareto front, and the576
search is restarted from it.577
Through the use of metaheuristics, the problem can be solved578
efficiently and quickly for a relatively small number of MNOs579
and SCs [25], [27], [28]. This assertion cannot be concluded580
and generalized for large networks. In the investigated network581
configuration with 5 MNOs, 15 SCs, and 9 bidding levels, the582
runtime of the solution is very short. At this point, let us clarify583
that the numbers selected for the MNOs and the SCs are based584
on the most typical and realistic scenarios in recent studies [18],585
[19] since the most common scenarios in European countries586
involve three to four MNOs, and 15 SCs can cover the service587
are of one macro BS.588
D. Pricing Strategy589
Having defined the ILP model, we now illustrate the payment590
rule, which is of crucial importance for the realization of the591
auction for the third party. The VCG payment induces all592
the users to reveal their actual valuations for the requested593
bandwidth. In the VCG mechanism, the third party charges the594
bidders (MNOs) with a price for the requested capacity. For595
example, an MNO who requires large bandwidth will have to596
pay a high price since its request results in dissatisfying other597
MNOs who lose in the auction because of the limited capacity598
resources and will not be able to offload their traffic.599
Let us denote by pln,m the price paid by the MNO n to the600
third party for the allocated capacity of the mth SC. The payoff601
function for bidder n that represents the difference between the602
gain of the MNO attained through the BS switching off and603
the true valuation minus the paid price (let us recall that in the604
truthful auction uln,m = bln,m) is605
Ui =
⎧⎨
⎩
CGi +
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
uli,m −
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
pli,m, if i is selected
−CBS, otherwise.
(26)
The payment rule for each MNO can be defined as follows:606
pli,m =
∑
n∈N\{i}
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
(
xli,m
){−i} · bli,m
−
⎛
⎝ ∑
n∈N\{i}
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xli,m · bli,m
−
∑
n∈N\{i}
∑
m∈M
∑
l∈L
xli,m · bli,m
⎞
⎠ (27)
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
where the first term is the aggregate valuation of the allocated 607
resources, (xln,m)
{−i}
, when MNO i does not participate at all 608
in the auction. The second term is the aggregate valuation of the 609
allocation xln,m of all MNOs other than i, when i participates 610
in the auction. Next, we prove that our optimized auction 611
mechanism possesses two important properties: 1) truthfulness 612
and 2) individual rationality. 613
Proposition 2 (Truthfulness): The payment rule defined in 614
(27) satisfies the truthfulness property. 615
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B in the supple- 616
mental file.  617
Proposition 3 (Individual Rationality): The payment rule 618
defined in (27) satisfies the individual rationality property, and 619
all bidders are guaranteed to obtain nonnegative utility. 620
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C in the supple- 621
mental file.  622
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 623
This section is composed of three parts. First, we explain 624
the simulation scenario employed both for the multiobjective 625
optimization and the system-level simulations. Second, we 626
present the results regarding the estimation of the Pareto front 627
for the multiobjective optimization solved by using the Matlab 628
tools. Finally, we show a performance comparison between 629
the proposed scheme and two state-of-the-art schemes with the 630
development of a custom-made C simulator. 631
A. Simulation Scenario 632
The simulation scenario corresponds to a dense HetNet de- 633
ployment, such as a university campus or an urban area. More 634
specifically, our scenario focuses on a cell served by the BSs of 635
N = 5 MNOs and M = 15 SCs that cover the whole cell area. 636
In our experiments, we consider various scenarios, wherein the 637
MNOs have different traffic volumes (i.e., ρ), different bidding 638
strategies (i.e., nontolerant, linear, and tolerant), different cost 639
requirements (i.e., z), and different bidding levels (i.e., L). 640
The system-level simulations are based on Monte Carlo exper- 641
iments, and the presented results focus on the night zone for 642
the duration of one year.5 The set of parameters is provided 643
in Table I. 644
To assess the performance of our scheme, we compare 645
the proposed multiobjective auction-base switching-off strat- 646
egy (referred to as MAS), to two benchmark solutions: 1) an 647
auction-based switching-off scheme, wherein the income of the 648
5Note that the results are calculated for the case of one macro cell, but they
can be easily extended to extended configurations. Furthermore, we consider
the period of one year since the yearly traffic is considered stable [30].
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Fig. 6. Estimation of Pareto front solutions. (a) Estimated Pareto front forAQ4
multiple MNOs’ requirements, L = 2 and linear bidding strategy. (b) Estimated
Pareto front for multiple bidding strategies, L = 2, and z = 0.1.
third party is the unique objective to be maximized (referred649
as ISO) [17]; and 2) a baseline scenario with full operational650
topology (FOT), where none of the BSs is switched off.651
B. Estimation of the Pareto Front652
Here, we present the Pareto front analysis. In this set of653
experiments, we assume that all operators have the same traffic654
volume equal to the maximum possible traffic load, i.e., ρn = 1.655
In addition, we assume that each MNO submits three different656
bids, corresponding to L = 2, to the third party.657
Fig. 6 shows the Pareto front solutions achieved by solving658
the proposed multiobjective problem for different minimum659
financial gains with the same bidding strategy [see Fig. 6(a)]660
and different bidding strategies with the same minimum profit661
requirement [see Fig. 6(b)]. In both figures, the third party’s662
annual financial gain that can be attained by leasing its re-663
sources to one MNO is represented in the x-axis, and the annual664
economic profits of one MNO are given in y-axis.665
In Fig. 6(a), the set of optimal solutions is shown for the666
linear bidding strategy. Note that the stochastic search per-667
formed by means of the metaheuristic algorithm succeeds in668
estimating a Pareto front for the given parameters of the studied 669
problem. As expected, in all the different cases, the higher the 670
third party’s income (f1(x)), the lower the financial gain of 671
the MNOs (f2(x)). Thus, the Pareto front is monotonically 672
decreasing, meaning that the improvement of one objective 673
leads to the deterioration of the other objective, and there is 674
no feasible global solution maximizing all the objectives. A 675
second observation relies on the motivation of the MNOs to 676
maximize their economic gains, which is a fact that can be 677
explored through the parameter z that reflects the requirements 678
of the minimum profit gain, denoted in (11). As it is plotted 679
in the figure, the greedy behavior of the MNOs for higher cost 680
gains (z = 0.5) leads to lower income for the third party and, 681
at the same time, a lower number of achievable solutions. This 682
result is of significant importance since a greedy behavior from 683
the MNOs’ perspective will produce lower bids that may not be 684
accepted by the third party; thus, the MNOs will not be able to 685
offload their whole traffic. The selection of a proper value of the 686
parameter z helps the operators to decide whether it is profitable 687
for them to bid by taking into account their financial needs, 688
and by observing Fig. 6(a), we conclude that lower values of 689
z lead to higher income for the two involved parties. To provide 690
further insights for our approach, let us also highlight that, in 691
a realistic scenario with a large number of macro BSs, the cost 692
gains for the MNOs and the third party are significantly higher. 693
For example, by applying the proposed switching off technique 694
to the central area of London where an MNO may have up to 695
500 deployed BSs [31], the economic gains may reach up to 696
∼12.500 C for the MNO and up to ∼25.000 C for the third 697
party. 698
In continuation, Fig. 6(b) illustrates the Pareto front by 699
examining different bidding strategies for the case of z = 0.1. 700
Again, we observe that the attained solutions are decreasing 701
monotonically. Moreover, as we see, the more tolerant the 702
bidding strategy of the MNOs, the higher financial gains for the 703
involved parties. This important insight can be easily explained 704
by taking into account the fact that a nontolerant MNO is more 705
greedy; thus, it requests more capacity for the same bids with 706
respect to a tolerant MNO, as shown in Fig. 5. As a result, 707
the third party may lose its incentive to lease the bandwidth, 708
and the economic benefits will be reduced for the MNOs and 709
the SC network. It is noted that the tolerant bidding strategy 710
offers better solutions due to the leasing of more resources and 711
the switching off of higher number of BSs, whereas the linear 712
bidding strategy implies an intermediate solution between the 713
extreme cases. Hence, along with the minimum guaranteed 714
profit, the bidding strategy is also an important indicator that 715
affects the decision of MNOs on bidding. 716
C. Numerical Results 717
Here, the performance results with regard to 718
telecommunication-oriented (network throughput and energy 719
efficiency) and cost-oriented (annual cost and income gains) 720
metrics are shown. In this set of experiments, we study a more 721
realistic scenario, where the MNOs have different traffic vol- 722
umes and, thus, different requirements and outcomes, when 723
our proposed algorithm is applied. According to recent studies 724
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Fig. 7. Annual energy efficiency for z = 0.1 and different bidding strategies.
(a) Tolerant bidding strategy. (b) Nontolerant bidding strategy.
[18], in most European countries, there are usually up to725
two telecommunication companies holding the major part726
of the market share, up to two smaller operators serving an727
intermediate portion of the users, and finally, up to one smaller728
MNO with a very small slice of the market. By exploiting these729
interesting findings, we consider the scenario in which two730
MNOs (i.e., BS1 and BS2) are fully loaded (ρ1 = ρ2 = 1.0),731
two operators (i.e., BS3 and BS4) have relatively lower traffic732
with ρ3 = ρ4 = 0.7, and the fifth MNO (denoted by BS5)733
has very low traffic (ρ5 = 0.3). The results presented in the734
following are calculated for an operating point on the Pareto735
front that is assumed to satisfy all the involved parties in the736
auction. We would like to highlight that the selection of a737
solution among the Pareto front solutions can be either derived738
through agreements between the involved parties or another739
distinguished entity may select it.740
1) Telecommunication Metrics: Fig. 7 presents the total741
network energy efficiency versus L for tolerant [see Fig. 7(a)]742
and nontolerant [see Fig. 7(b)] bidding strategies. The number743
of switched-off BSs of every algorithm is also shown in the744
plot (right y-axis), along with the percentage gains in terms745
of energy efficiency of our approach compared with the state-746
of-the-art works. First, we observe that the energy efficiency747
achieved by the MAS scheme increases with the number of748
levels for tolerant and nontolerant bidding since the biggest749
Fig. 8. Annual energy efficiency for different bidding levels and strategies.
variety of the proposed bids (higher number of levels) implies 750
a higher number of choices for the resource allocation. Another 751
important remark is that MAS significantly outperforms the 752
baseline scenario, FOT, (where no BS is switched off), and 753
the ISO algorithm. The better performance of our proposal in 754
terms of energy efficiency is justified by the higher number 755
of switched-off BSs as this is highlighted also in the plots. 756
As we have already mentioned in Section III-C, the goal of 757
our proposal lies in maximizing the energy efficiency, an ob- 758
jective neglected in the auction-based works of the literature, 759
whereby only the maximization of the third party’s income 760
was considered. Comparing the behavior of our algorithm in 761
the two figures, it can be observed that the tolerant bidding 762
strategy achieves more considerable gains with respect to the 763
nontolerant bidding, mainly due to the deactivation of many 764
underutilized BSs in the network. These results emphasize 765
the role of the bidding strategy and the number of bidding 766
levels on the achievable energy efficiency, thus providing the 767
necessary insights to the MNOs to select the most appropriate 768
strategy based on their interests. In Fig. 8, the conclusions of 769
Fig. 7(b) and (a) are better illustrated since the comparison 770
between the three schemes and the different bidding strategies 771
is more clearly shown. Finally, we should mention that the 772
results of linear bidding are not shown here for simplicity, given 773
that the achieved gains range between the two aforementioned 774
cases. 775
Along with the total network energy efficiency performance, 776
it is interesting to study the individual energy efficiency gains 777
of the different MNOs. To that end, the individual gains for 778
the specific (but representative) case of z = 0.1 and the two 779
different bidding strategies are quantified in Table II, where 780
interesting conclusions can be extracted. In particular, inde- 781
pendently of the bidding strategy and the number of L, the 782
ISO scheme is beneficial only for the group of operators that 783
switch off their BSs, who are always the same (MNO1 and 784
MNO2), whereas the rest of the operators always keep their 785
BSs active. More specifically, the MNOs that switch off their 786
BSs theoretically achieve infinite energy efficiency, as they 787
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TABLE II
OPERATOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY (X 104 Mbits/Joule) WITH RESPECT TO THE FOT SCHEME FOR z = 0.1
Fig. 9. (a) Normalized throughput for different bidding levels and strategies.
(b) Number of lacking PRBs.
have their traffic served at zero energy cost, whereas the active788
operators serve their own traffic without improving their situa-789
tion. The proposed MAS eliminates this unfairness by offering790
the chance to more MNOs to switch off their BSs, providing791
them with extra incentives to participate in the auction. The792
individual gains are remarkable of our proposal for both the793
MNOs and the whole network.794
Despite the importance of the energy efficiency results, the795
deactivation of the BSs in the network and the traffic offloading796
to the SCs potentially implies loss of connections. To that797
end, we study the normalized throughput that represents the798
percentage of served connections in the system. In Fig. 9(a),799
it can be observed that, as the number of switched-off BSs800
increases, the MAS approach experiences small losses (around801
5% and 3% for tolerant and nontolerant bidding, respectively). 802
The degraded performance is explained by the high number 803
of deactivated BSs, leading to the service of all the traffic 804
mainly by the SC network (since at most one BS remains 805
active). The MNOs are able to decide whether the throughput 806
performance can be sacrificed to achieve energy efficiency, or 807
even small losses are prohibitive (thus, a tolerant strategy is not 808
acceptable). The results in terms of lacking PRBs are given 809
in Fig. 9(b). As it is observed, a larger number of PRBs are 810
lacking, when the MAS strategy is applied. In our case, there 811
are different reasons for the degraded throughput performance. 812
The unserved users exist because either lower bids (thus, fewer 813
PRBs) are selected or the overall PRBs are not adequate for the 814
total offloaded traffic. However, the impact on the throughput is 815
negligible, as it was shown in Fig. 9(a). 816
2) Cost Metrics: The total annual network cost and the 817
individual annual gains for the operators and the third party, 818
compared with the state-of-the-art algorithm and having as a 819
benchmark the FOT scheme, are presented in Figs. 10 and 12, 820
respectively. 821
The annual network cost is given versus the different number 822
of bidding levels and for the tolerant [see Fig. 10(a)] and 823
nontolerant [see Fig. 10(b)] bidding strategies, respectively. 824
The total network cost is the sum of the average cost of all 825
MNOs and the third party for the operation of all infrastructures 826
(i.e., the active BSs and SCs). The first observation is that the 827
network cost is the same for level pairs (l = 3 and l = 5) and 828
(l = 7 and l = 9) for the MAS algorithm, due to the number 829
of switched-off BSs that is the same for the two cases. The 830
MAS scheme achieves a considerable reduction up to 94% 831
and 96% for tolerant bidding, when compared with ISO and 832
FOT schemes, respectively. For the case of nontolerant bidding 833
strategy, the cost reduction is lower. This result is explained by 834
the fact that MNOs are more greedy, and in their attempt to 835
increase their economic gains, they do not offer high bids for 836
the requested capacity. As a consequence, the third party does 837
not accept the allocation of resources to low prices, and some 838
BSs may not be switched off. Concerning the ISO scheme, we 839
observe that the total annual cost is not affected by the different 840
bidding levels since, in ISO auction, only one bid is offered 841
based on the maximum traffic expectations, and fewer BSs are 842
deactivated. A clear comparison between MAS, for tolerant and 843
nontolerant bidding, and ISO is given in Fig. 11, where the 844
annual network cost behavior is highlighted. 845
The individual revenue of each MNO and the third party is 846
plotted in Fig. 12. We may observe that, similar to the energy 847
efficiency gains, the ISO scheme provides financial gains only 848
to particular operators (MNO1 and MNO2) and particularly to 849
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Fig. 10. Annual network cost for z = 0.1 and different bidding strategies.
(a) Tolerant bidding strategy. (b) Nontolerant bidding strategy.
Fig. 11. Annual network cost for different bidding levels and strategies.
the MNOs that switch off their networks, whereas the economic850
gains of the remaining operators are zero compared with the851
FOT scheme since these MNOs keep their BSs active and serve852
Fig. 12. Annual cost gain for z = 0.1 and different bidding strategies.
(a) Tolerant bidding strategy. (b) Nontolerant bidding strategy.
their own traffic without having any benefit from the auction. 853
On the other hand, for the proposed MAS approach, more 854
operators are able to have economic benefits, independently of 855
the particular number of levels. Furthermore, as the number of 856
bidding levels increases, the MAS algorithm achieves higher 857
financial gains for the operators due to the higher number 858
of combinations of bids offered. In addition, for the tolerant 859
bidding strategy [see Fig. 12(a)], the economic gains are higher 860
compared with the nontolerant behavior [see Fig. 12(b)]. 861
D. Discussion 862
Based on the analysis in Sections IV-B and IV-C, we have 863
shown that the proposed MAS scheme outperforms the state-of- 864
the-art approaches in terms of energy efficiency (network and 865
individual), annual network cost, and individual cost gains. In 866
addition, it achieves balanced results for the MNOs with respect 867
to the individual energy efficiency and cost gains. Furthermore, 868
through a performance assessment, we have identified the sig- 869
nificance of the bidding behavior, the number of levels, and pa- 870
rameter z. In particular, better performance results are attained 871
in terms of energy efficiency, aggregate network cost, and indi- 872
vidual cost gains, when a higher number of levels are chosen 873
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and through tolerant bidding. Moreover, higher values of z874
achieve lower gains for both the MNOs and the third party. Fi-875
nally, although minor losses may appear in terms of throughput,876
the attained benefits with respect to energy efficiency, individ-877
ual and network cost gains are remarkable and are adequate for878
giving the necessary incentives to the MNOs and the third party879
to apply the proposed auction-based switching-off strategy.880
V. CONCLUSION881
In this paper, motivated by the low BS utilization during882
the night and the coexistence of multiple MNOs and third-883
party SCs in the same area, we proposed a novel auction-based884
offloading and switching-off algorithm that achieves energy885
savings and cost reduction by encouraging MNOs to offload886
their traffic and switch off the redundant BSs. Moreover, by887
employing auction tools and novel bidding strategies, we intro-888
duced a switching-off scheme that allows the MNOs to reduce889
their expenditures. The proposed scheme has been evaluated890
in terms of energy efficiency and cost metrics for various891
conditions (different bidding levels and behaviors). The results892
have shown that our proposal can significantly improve the893
network energy efficiency, guaranteeing at the same time the894
throughput. Regarding the financial costs/gains, the proposed895
scheme provides higher cost benefits and fairness compared896
with the state-of-the-art algorithms. It provides also interesting897
insights concerning the rules and behaviors that the MNOs898
should follow when they participate in an auction strategy. The899
study of other schemes for the solution of the problem (such900
as backwards induction) and the potential trade-offs would be901
interesting research line for future works.902
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